Taxation of capital gains upon realization instead of accrual provides incentives to hold winners as long as possible and sell losers immediately. This so called lock-in effect possibly distorts the liquidation and investment decision and hence is usually regarded to be harmful. The paper analyzes the impact the method of taxation has on asset prices and welfare within a simple general equilibrium model of an exchange economy. It is shown that a switch from an accrual to a realization based tax system generally results in rising asset prices. However, contrary to conventional wisdom, total welfare does not necessarily decrease.
The basic problem of capital gains taxation
In most of the world's economies changes in the value of an investor's asset (or entire portfolio) are subject to a tax, the so called capital gains tax. There are basically two different methods of collecting this tax: taxation of capital gains upon accrual or upon realization.
Under an accrual system -sometimes also referred to as 'yield-to-maturity' approach -the tax is payable, in theory, as soon as there is a change in the value of an asset 1 or, in practise, periodically. Among others the most severe problems that arise under an accrual tax are those of liquidity and valuation. Some investors might be forced to sell some of their assets, which they would keep hold of otherwise, just in order to pay the tax. For some assets that are not frequently or not publicly traded it can be very costly if not impossible to permanently or periodically assess their value.
For those practical reasons, assets for which such problems arise, like stock or stock options, are mostly taxed upon realization. Under a realization system -sometimes also referred to as 'wait and see' approach -the tax is payable only when the investor sells the asset thereby realizing a gain or a loss. Solving the problems mentioned above, the realization tax creates a new problem of his own by distorting the investor's optimal liquidation policy and hence possibly his investment decision. To see this, look at the following example:
The owner of an asset with basis P 0 , actual price P 1 and final payout P 2 decides on either selling and repurchasing the asset in period 1 or holding the asset till period 2 in order to maximize his period-2-payout after taxation at the constant rate 0 < τ < 1.
Under an accrual tax the investor obviously is indifferent between the two strategies.
2 Under a realization system the after-tax payout in period 2 following the 'hold'-strategy is W H := P 2 − τ (P 2 − P 0 ), whereas the 'sell and repurchase'-strategy yields
A comparison of the two strategies shows that
1 e.g. by a change in the asset price 2 Both strategies leave him with the same after-tax payout in period 2 equal to W R .
If one assumes that, as in most of the relevant cases, the investor expected the asset to appreciate when he purchased it and still does in period 1 (P 0 , P 1 ≤ P 2 ), the optimal liquidation policy according to (1) suggests to defer gains (as long as possible) and realize losses (immediately). The same result is derived by Constantinides (1983) from a similar situation, but where firstly the asset is risky, secondly there is an alternative investment opportunity, which thirdly is taxed upon accrual, i.e. different taxation methods coexist. 3 The above analysis shows that the result hinges on neither of those additional assumptions.
However, additionally assuming the existence of an alternative investment opportunity, Auerbach (1991) shows that the investor finds it optimal to keep hold of an asset with accrued capital gains instead of selling it and buying the alternative one even for some (expected) pre-tax rates of return smaller than the alternative pre-tax rate. This indicates that besides the distortion of the optimal liquidation policy a realization-based tax possibly leads to inefficient portfolio selection and a distortion of the investment decision.
Considering these distortions there is a natural question arising: Does taxation of capital gains upon realization do harm creating a welfare loss? Put differently: Is social welfare smaller under a realization tax than under an accrual tax? The answer usually given in the economic literature is yes 4 , but the reasoning is rather based on heuristic considerations than proper analysis in a formal model. 5 The present paper tries to fill the gap and examines the question more closely.
Of course a welfare analysis within the framework used in the above example, where asset prices are exogenously given, is not very fruitful as it neglects the impact a specific method of capital gains taxation has on asset prices. To take this price effect into account but still keep the analysis tractable, a simple general equilibrium model of an exchange economy is investigated that cannot fully answer the question but is able to provide some hints, how a more complete picture might look like. It is shown that in the presence of accrued capital gains asset prices are higher under a realization tax than under an accrual system. However, the impact the method of taxation has on welfare is ambiguous: Contrary to conventional wisdom a switch from an accrual to a realization system does not necessarily reduce total welfare.
Usually, both distorting effects arising from taxing capital gains upon 3 The assumption of a riskless, tax exempt bond by Constantinides (1983) is equivalent to the assumption of a riskless bond taxed upon accrual, which yields the same after tax rate. 4 See the review of the literature in section 2.
5 See e.g. Kovenock & Rothschild (1987) .
realization are summarized and labelled the lock-in effect. Nevertheless for analytical purposes it is worth while distinguishing between one and the other: The effect on the optimal liquidation policy is always present and referred to as primary lock-in effect for the remainder of this paper. The effect on the investment decision arises only in the presence of alternative investment opportunities and is referred to as secondary lock-in effect. Note again that the assumptions of uncertainty and the coexistence of different taxation methods are not necessary for those effects to occur. Hence the analysis stated below surrenders these assumptions in order to isolate the lock-in effect from possibly additional effects due to risk 6 and the concomitance of different taxation methods. Moreover, to begin with only the impact of the primary lock-in effect is investigated.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 offers a short review of the related literature. Section 3 specifies the model by introducing some basic and technical assumptions and establishes the consumer's problem of utility maximization under different regimes of capital gains taxation. Comparative statics results are mostly in line with the existing literature but still offer some surprising insights that have been overlooked so far. In section 4 the impact of the method of taxation on asset prices and welfare is analyzed by studying a switch from an accrual system to a realization tax. It is shown that asset prices rise but welfare does not necessarily fall. Section 5 concludes discussing some possible extensions of the model.
Review of the literature
One branch of the literature on realization based taxation of capital gains consists of a series of articles that consider the lock-in effect to be harmful and hence search for tax systems avoiding or, at least, reducing the problem. Such proposals are mostly based upon the idea of imitating an accrual tax by retrospective taxation on a realization basis, first expressed in Vickrey (1939) , and are found in the economic 7 as well as in the tax law literature 8 . While these papers ask, how a realization based tax system should look like to circumvent the distortions raised by the lock-in effect, there is another branch of the literature on that topic that puts a different question: How are portfolio selection and asset prices affected if capital gains are taxed upon realization?
As in Auerbach (1991) the impact on portfolio selection can be analyzed within a partial equilibrium framework, where asset prices or, equivalently, pre-tax rates of return are exogenously given. Balcer & Judd (1987) show that the method of capital gains taxation as well as investor's individual horizons for saving will affect optimal portfolio composition. Kovenock & Rothschild (1987) compute the effective tax rates under a realization system and compare the net returns of different portfolio strategies. If one wants to take price effects into account, however, a general equilibrium model has to be engaged.
As pointed out, for example by Lang & Shackelford (2000) , whenever investigating price effects of capital gains taxation one has to be aware of an impact that arises independently from the method of taxation, be it accrual or realization based: A higher tax rate lowers the after-tax return of an asset which in turn results in a lower demand for the assets and hence, given a fix supply, a lower asset price. This so called capitalization effect is opposed to the lock-in effect that occurs only under a realization based system: A higher tax rate induces bigger incentives to postpone the realization of accrued capital gains resulting in higher demand for those assets and hence, given a fix supply, higher asset prices. The intuition behind that can also be stated as follows: The owner of an asset with accrued capital gains will sell it only if he is compensated for the tax advantage he foregoes by selling it. Thus prices must rise. Empirical studies mostly show the dominance of the capitalization effect 9 , but also evidence for the lock-in effect can be found 10 . There is a broad literature modelling the capitalization effect in different settings under the assumption of an accrual tax. 11 In contrast, so far only few articles exist that explicitly account for the fact that capital gains are usually taxed upon realization, and hence are able to incorporate the lock-in effect.
Constantinides (1983) develops a capital asset pricing model under the assumptions of a realization tax and perfect capital markets. However, using short-selling strategies, in his model investors are able to separate their liquidation decision from their consumption and saving decision and thus to defer tax payments until so called 'events of forced liquidation' (e.g. death). Consequently, the lock-in effect is capitalized in the asset prices only to the extend such events occur. Stiglitz (1983) shows that under realistic assumptions, by applying so- phisticated trading strategies investors on perfect capital markets can avoid not only the payment of realization based capital gains taxes but all income taxes. This provides an indication and Poterba (1987) supports empirical evidence that the assumptions of perfect capital markets, especially the one of unlimited short-selling, are not sustainable if one wants to describe a reality in which investors pay a considerable amount of capital gains taxes. Klein (1999) engages a general equilibrium model to study the impact of capital gains taxation on asset prices and portfolio selection under the assumptions of imperfect capital markets, i.e. no short-selling is allowed. In a multi period setting finitely many individuals maximize their utility from consumption by periodically deciding on how much to consume and save given their initial endowments. The investment opportunities are exogenously given and consist in a riskless asset taxed upon accrual and finitely many risky assets taxed upon realization. His findings can be summarized as follows: The pre-tax returns for assets with accrued capital gains are smaller, i.e. their prices are higher, than for assets without such accrued gains. The lock-in effect is capitalized in asset prices and can possibly overcompensate for the capitalization effect. Put differently, asset prices may increase by higher taxes. Moreover, the optimal portfolio selection depends not only on one's own amount of accrued capital gains and saving horizon but also on the amounts of accrued capital gains and the saving horizons of all other investors.
The complexity of Klein's framework makes it very hard if not impossible to use it for a welfare analysis. His model is rich in the sense that it does not only account for the pure effects of capital gains taxation 12 but also for possibly additional effects arising from uncertainty and the coexistence of different taxation methods. On the one hand this richness makes the model describe reality quite well, on the other hand makes it hard to identify the driving force behind the results of the model. This leads to the idea, presented in more detail in the following sections, to simplify the model in order to separate the different effects from each other. The aim is to remain in the position to analyze the impact the method of capital gains taxation has on asset prices but in addition to get into a position that allows to undertake a welfare analysis. The model described below accomplishes that by renouncing risk and the coexistence of different tax systems. Furthermore, to begin with, only the impact of the primary lock-in effect will be analyzed, i.e. there is a single saving opportunity.
A simple general equilibrium model
In this section, the model outlined above is developed more formally and used to derive some comparative statistics results for different regimes of capital gains taxation.
Basic assumptions
Look at a two period (t ∈ {1, 2}) exchange economy with two agents (i ∈ {1, 2}), who are price takers and trade only at equilibrium prices. Given their initial endowments, they maximize their utility U i (c , deciding on how much to save in period 1. To guarantee the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium 13 assume the preferences to be continuous, strictly convex, strongly monotone, and, moreover, such that consumption in period t is a normal commodity, as it is common for large aggregates 14 . For the time being and the reasons mentioned above let there be a single saving opportunity: one arbitrarily divisible share of an asset with safe payout of P 2 consumption goods in period 2. Additionally, the assumption of no short-selling could be made but is not necessary since by Assumption 2 of the following subsection short-selling does never take place.
Technical assumptions
As usual, the consumer's preferences are assumed to be representable by monotonically increasing, concave utility functions. For analytical convenience assume additionally that their cross derivatives be nonnegative 15 ; more formally: Assumption 1 Consumer's preferences can be expressed by utility functions
The most general framework would allow for arbitrary amounts of consumption goods in both periods and an arbitrary division of the share in period 1 as the consumer's initial endowments. However, such a setting would create the problem of identifying the seller and the buyer of the asset respectively. As in Klein (1999) one had to separately look at the cases where consumer 1 is either the buyer or the seller or no trade takes place. To avoid this problem the following assumption is made:
Assumption 2 At the beginning of period 1 consumer 1 holds one unit of the asset purchased at some prior time 16 with basis P 0 ≤ P 2 but no other wealth, whereas consumer 2 has initial wealth W in consumption goods but no shares. Besides the payout of the asset, none of them has any additional income in period 2.
Therefore, at any equilibrium consumer 1 sells shares to consume in period 1 and consumer 2 buys them to consume in period 2. Admittedly this situation is not the only possible scenario but an economically interesting and relevant one: There is heterogeneity between the agents with respect to their share ownership and hence, under Assumption 3, with respect to their accrued capital gains.
Assumption 3
In equilibrium the asset price P 1 in period 1 satisfies
Again, this assumption is primarily made to abbreviate the analysis and avoid case differentiation. But now it is not an assumption on the input but the outcome of the model and thus seems to be quite strong at a first glance. Three different arguments can be made in order to defend it: First of all, it can be shown that for any given utility functions with the above properties there are values for the parameters P 0 , P 2 and W such that an equilibrium with P 0 ≤ P 1 ≤ P 2 exists, i.e. the analysis does not refer to the empty set. Secondly, there is no risk in the model and thus a constellation at which the asset is appreciating over time seems to be most plausible to look at. Finally, if one wants to study the influence of accrued capital gains, one has to consider situations in which at least P 0 ≤ P 1 .
The problem under different tax regimes
In period 1 the asset is traded. Let S i be the fraction of the asset consumer i possesses after trade has taken place. The market clearing condition requires
16 For the analysis of the accrual tax regime it is convenient to assume that this time lies in period 0 in order to guarantee that no capital gains taxes have been paid for the asset until period 1. Now the consumer's problem can be stated and analyzed under different tax regimes. To highlight some basic equilibrium properties first look at
The problem without taxation.
By the choice of
and
respectively hold. From the first order conditions
one derives price dependent demand functions S i (P 1 ) for the asset and from the market clearing condition (2) an equilibrium price P * 1 . Applying the implicit function theorem on the first order conditions yields the following comparative statics results:
An increasing asset price P 1 makes consumption in period 1 relatively cheaper, i.e. has a negative substitution effect on consumption in period 2 and hence decreases savings S i for both consumers. While the income effect is also negative for agent 2, it is positive for agent 1. Therefore the asset demand of consumer 2 is clearly decreasing in the asset price, whereas the effect is not clear cut for consumer 1.
Under the assumptions made, there is -as mentioned above -always an equilibrium price but it is not necessarily unique. However, in the case of multiple equilibria for almost every combination of values W and P 2 a locally isolated equilibrium price P * 1 exists such that aggregated asset demand is decreasing in P 1 18 , i.e.
The following analysis refers always to this type of equilibrium. 17 The formal analysis is presented in appendix A. 
The problem with taxation upon accrual
Under an accrual tax the consumer's budget constraints are given by
respectively and the first order conditions for a maximum become
Now the consumer's asset demand depends not only on the price P 1 but also on the tax rate τ . Additionally, consumer 1's consumption and hence asset demand responds to changes in accrued capital gains, i.e. changes in the basis P 0 . Consequently, in general one has S 1 = S 1 (P 1 , τ, P 0 ) and S 2 = S 2 (P 1 , τ ) respectively and hence the equilibrium price P * 1 = P * 1 (τ, P 0 ) is also a function of tax rate and accrued capital gains.
With the same reasoning as before, the comparative statics results of expression (6) hold in the presence of an accrual tax.
19
Investigating changes in the tax rate one gets a somewhat surprising result:
Because income and substitution effect work in opposite directions with respect to consumption in period 1, in the absence of additional assumptions, a change in the tax rate has no clear-cut effect on the consumer's saving decision and hence the price effect is ambiguous as well. This is often overlooked by the literature describing the depressing nature of the capitalization effect 21 : Even under an accrual system an increasing tax rate does not necessarily result in decreasing asset prices.
Moreover, in the existing literature, the amount of capital gains is often thought to be neutral under an accrual tax in the sense that it does not affect the saving and investment decision. 22 However, this is not true if taxes are 19 The formal analysis is presented in appendix A.2. 20 The formal analysis is presented in appendix A.2.
21 See e.g. Lang & Shackelford (2000) . 22 See e.g. Auerbach (1991) .
collected only periodically like in the model presented here. To see this first note that consumer 2's problem and thus asset demand are not altered by a change in the accrued capital gain of consumer 1, i.e. by a change in P 0 . In contrast, a lower accrued gain, i.e. higher P 0 , has a pure income effect increasing consumer 1's consumption in both periods. Since his period 2 consumption does not depend directly on P 0 it can only be augmented by saving more, i.e.
Using this result, applying the implicit function theorem on the market clearing condition (2), and employing inequality (7) one gets dP * 1
Put differently, as a reaction to higher accrued gains total asset demand and hence equilibrium price may decrease.
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The problem with taxation upon realization While consumer 2's budget constraints (9) and first order condition (10) do not alter under a realization system, consumer 1 now faces the following constraints
resulting in the first order condition
As a consequence, if there is heterogeneity among the agents with respect to their accrued capital gains, i.e. if P 0 < P 1 , consumers do no longer face the same relative prices for consumption in period 1 and 2 respectively.
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Comparative statics show that relations (6) and (11) still hold under a realization tax. 26 This means in particular that, as in Klein (1999) , an increasing tax rate may possibly lead to higher asset prices.
However, the prediction of Klein (1999) that the pre-tax returns for assets with accrued capital gains be smaller, i.e. their prices be higher, than for assets without such accrued gains cannot be verified in this setting. Yet, in contrast to the case of an accrual system 27 , under a realization tax higher accrued capital gains can possibly increase asset prices as the following comparative statics show:
and hence dP
The intuition behind this result is as follows: Now, a smaller accrued gain, i.e. higher P 0 , does not only result in a positive income effect on consumption in both periods but also in a substitution effect such that consumption in period 2 becomes more expensive. Thus the overall effect on consumption in period 2 and hence saving is not clear cut.
Comparative statics results
The results derived so far can be summarized in the following way: In general the optimal investment decision of an investor depends on his accrued capital gain, even under an accrual tax. Under an accrual tax P 1 is increasing in P 0 , i.e. the higher the accrued capital gain the lower the asset price. Under a realization tax, in general the impact of a change in P 0 on P 1 is ambiguous, i.e. the effect possibly can but does not necessarily have to be reverted. Moreover, the influence of a change in the tax rate on asset prices is not clear cut either, not even under an accrual system.
A change in the method of taxation
In this section the impact the method of capital gains taxation has on asset prices and welfare is investigated. In order to do so, a situation in which a change in the method of taxation from an accrual based system to a realization based one takes place is considered. Of course one could as well analyze the opposite switch thereby getting equivalent results.
The Impact on asset prices
To carry out a welfare analysis, first one has to learn how equilibrium prices are affected by a certain policy change.
Proposition 1 (Price effect) Given a fixed tax rate 0 < τ < 1, in the presence of accrued capital gains (P 0 < P 1 ) a switch from an accrual based tax system to a realization based one leads to an increase of the equilibrium asset price P * 1 . The result is very intuitive: While consumer 2 is not affected by the change, the realization system creates an incentive for agent 1 to defer part of his accrued gains till period 2 in order to save taxes. Thus total demand for the asset and hence its price increase; more formally:
Proof. Consumer 2's problem and hence asset demand S 2 (P 1 ) stay unchanged. As for any given P 0 < P 1 ≤ P 2 inequality (1) ensures
consumer 1's problem is affected in two ways: First his budget set grows. Secondly consumption in period 2 becomes relatively cheaper. Since consumption in period 2 is a normal commodity, both income and substitution effect are positive with respect to period 2 consumption of consumer 1, and hence c 1 2 increases. However, this is only possible by an increase in his savings S 1 , because for any given P 0 < P 1 ≤ P 2 by the constraints (8) and (14) respectively
holds, i.e. ceteris paribus consumer 1's consumption in period 2 is higher under an accrual than a realization system. Therefore consumer 1's demand S 1 (P 1 ) and thus total demand for the asset are rising. By inequality (7), that results in an increasing equilibrium price P * 1 . 2
The Impact on welfare
In order to investigate welfare effects in a framework with taxes, in general one has to take into account how tax revenues are spent in the public sector. As stated by the following lemma, in the present setting this problem fortunately can be neglected: Assuming that the government does not discount 29 , total tax revenue and hence expenditures are not affected by the policy change under consideration.
Lemma 1 Given a fixed tax rate 0 < τ < 1 and no intertemporal discounting by the public authorities (ρ = 0), a switch from an accrual based tax system to a realization based one leaves the total tax revenue unchanged.
Proof. Compare the total tax revenue under an accrual system T acc and a realization one T real respectively:
2
Note in particular that under neither system the revenue depends on the asset price P 1 in period 1. By means of proposition 1 and lemma 1 it is possible to show the following statement concerning total welfare.
Proposition 2 (Welfare effect) Given a fixed tax rate 0 < τ < 1 and no intertemporal discounting by the authorities (ρ = 0), a switch from an accrual based tax system to a realization based one leads not necessarily to a decline in total (utilitarian) welfare.
Proof. Since the assertion is trivial for P 0 = P 1 , in the following assume P 0 < P 1 , i.e. there are accrued capital gains. By lemma 1, total tax revenue and thus expenditure remains unchanged. Put differently, there is no welfare effect caused by a change in public spending. As seen in the proof of proposition 1 the switch from accrual to realization based taxation has no direct effect on the problem of consumer 2 but increases the budget set and hence utility of consumer 1. Additionally, by proposition 1 the equilibrium price P 1 increases, which has two opposed effects: On the one hand, this further relaxes the budget constraint (14) of consumer 1 and thus increases his budget set and hence utility. On the other hand, this tightens the budget constraint (9) of consumer 2 and thus decreases his budget set and hence utility. Therefore, total (utilitarian) welfare does not necessarily decrease.
Note that the statement of proposition 2 is true not only for social welfare functions of the utilitarian type but also for others like Rawlsian or generalized utilitarian, as long as no further assumptions on the preferences are made. The above result is somewhat surprising as there is a whole branch of literature on how to avoid the lock-in effect of capital gains taxation upon realization.
30 However, there are some authors, like Kovenock & Rothschild (1987) , who doubt there is a strong negative welfare effect arising from a realization tax. The analysis presented here may be seen as a further justification for this point of view.
Distributional aspects
In view of proposition 2, without further assumptions efficiency does not provide a good justification for an accrual tax on normative grounds. In contrast, fairness might do so: As demonstrated in the proof of proposition 2, the switch from an accrual based tax system to a realization based one discriminates against consumer 2 while it favors consumer 1, i.e. it is in favor of agents with relatively large accrued capital gains. It should be easy to find empirical evidence for the claim that such gains occur more often among 'wealthy' individuals than 'poor'. Given this presumption, a realization based tax system in which the lock-in effect is present has to be refused if the political aim is to 'close the gap'.
Extensions and concluding remarks
The paper has investigated the effects the method of capital gains taxationeither accrual or realization based -has within a simple general equilibrium model. Besides the comparative statics results summarized in section 3, it has been shown that under the assumptions made equilibrium asset prices are higher under a realization tax than under an accrual tax, whereas the impact a switch from an accrual to a realization system has on welfare is ambiguous.
The analysis can be extended in various directions. So far, only the distortion of the liquidation decision is incorporated but not the distortion of the investment decision. To take this secondary lock-in effect into account one should look at a situation with alternative saving opportunities and where both taxation methods coexist. Within such a setting instead of looking at a switch from one to the other taxation method one would have to study the homogenization of a hybrid system towards either a pure accrual or realization tax, something that is definitely closer to what can be observed in reality.
It would also be more realistic to allow for arbitrary initial endowments. Nevertheless, in order to investigate the interesting cases with different amounts of accrued capital gains among consumers, one has to introduce some source of heterogeneity between the agents. And the easiest way to do so is by assuming different initial endowments.
The consideration of multiple periods and multiple consumers seems not very promising either, as it would considerably complicate the analysis while presumably not change the results a lot.
The relation between uncertainty and the taxation of capital gains is mostly studied under an accrual system and the results depend upon if and how tax revenues are used in the corresponding model. 31 Kovenock & Rothschild (1987) explicitly assume a realization tax and show that due to the lock-in effect the effective tax rate is higher in the presence of risk. It would be interesting to investigate what that means within the framework presented here.
One of the most promising extensions and a step towards reality certainly would be to look at a model with endogenous production. As long as production, i.e. asset supply, is exogenously given, the lock-in effect is at most able to distort the decisions on consumption and saving (portfolio selection) but not on real investment. Hence the welfare analysis presented in this paper is still quite incomplete and has to be subjected to further research.
A Comparative statics A.1 The case of no taxation
Applying the implicit function theorem on the first order conditions (5) yields for i ∈ {1, 2}
Using the quotient rule and taking assumption 1 as well as the budget constraints (3) and (4) respectively into account, one can determine the sign of the following terms
and hence the sign of the expressions in (17) as stated in (6).
A.2 The case of accrual taxation
Applying the implicit function theorem on the first order conditions (10) yields for i ∈ {1, 2}
As above but using the budget constraints (8) and (9) respectively, one can determine the sign of the following terms ≤ 0 , and hence the sign of the expressions in (18) , (19) , and (20) as stated in (6), (11) , and (12) respectively.
A.3 The case of realization taxation
Applying the implicit function theorem on the first order condition (15) for consumer 1 and (10) for consumer 2 respectively yields 
As above but now using the budget constraints (14) and (9) 
and hence the sign of the expressions in (21), (22), (23), (24) , and (25) as stated in (6), (11) , and (16) respectively.
